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DISCOUNTED STOCKS AND EXCESS ANALYST COVERAGE 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we examine whether the negative excess value of stocks (stock discounts in the Berger and 
Ofek (1995) spirit) is associated with low excess analyst coverage over the 1979-1997 period. We define 
excess analyst coverage as the difference between a firm’s actual analyst following and its imputed 
coverage. We hypothesize that firms with high excess (low) analyst coverage are exposed to less (more) 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, managerial misconduct and uncertainty about 
future earnings than do other firms. Therefore, stocks with low excess analyst coverage profile are 
expected to trade at low prices as they would be more difficult for investors to value.  Our findings provide 
evidence in support of the view that excess analyst coverage explains a significant portion of stocks’ 
discount, indicating that higher (lower) excess analyst coverage leads to more (less) informative stock 
prices and offers an information-based explanation on why stocks trade at a premium (discount) . Our 
empirical results are also consistent with the notion that stocks of firms with high managerial power (i.e., 
low investor rights/weak corporate governance) trade at a discount. Finally, our analysis indicates that the 
information inherent in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, a surrogate for investor uncertainty, plays an 
important role in the determination of asset prices.  
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DISCOUNTED STOCKS AND EXCESS ANALYST COVERAGE 
 
      
I. Introduction  
The role of financial analysis has increased dramatically over the years, a reflection of the 
growing demand of analysts’ services. For instance, in 1978 less than 30 percent of U.S. firms were 
covered by security analysts while in 1996 more than 63 percent of traded firms were covered.1 Analysts 
produce earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for the use of market participants.2  The reports 
of financial analysts are widely distributed and are of substantial interest to investors and researchers.3 An 
empirical investigation of the value that is potentially created by security analysts is therefore germane to 
the investment community and for the understanding of financial markets.4  
 While it is generally believed that stock prices are more likely to reflect their fundamental values 
in the presence of financial analysis, many firms’ stocks trade at a discount (i.e., below their industry-
based imputed values) in spite of the deepening of analyst coverage in recent years. This raises the 
question of whether such discounts are linked to the degree of analyst coverage.5 In this paper we 
address the excess value of the firm’s equity from the excess analyst coverage perspective.6  A distinct 
feature of our empirical design is the development of the excess analyst coverage measure. We define 
excess analyst coverage as the difference between a firm’s actual analyst following and its imputed 
coverage. Imputed analyst coverage is measured as the sum of the average number of analysts covering 
                                                                 
1 See Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). 
2 Earnings forecasts generated by security analysts are widely used by  investors in their investment decisions and is 
believed to exert a greater influence on stock prices than historical measures of growth (see, for example, Elton, 
Gruber and Gultekin (1981), Rozeff (1983), Vander Weide and Carleton (1984), and Stanley, Lewellen and 
Schlarbaum (1984)). 
3 Earnings forecasts by analysts are often viewed as surrogates of investor expectations (Cragg and Malkiel (1968), 
Malkiel (1982), Givoly and Lakonishok (1984), La Porta (1996)). 
4 The importance of financial analysis has been revived by Womack (1996). He examined analysts’ buy and sell 
recommendations of major brokerage houses and  found them to have an immediate and a post-recommendation 
effect on stock prices.    
5 In a different context, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) proxy information diffusion with residual analyst coverage and 
examine whether the momentum in s tock returns is driven by the residual number of analysts tracking different 
stocks. 
6 Excess value is defined as in Berger and Ofek (1995). 
 a similar firm in the same industry, adjusting for size.7  Negative (positive) excess analyst coverage values 
indicate weak (strong) coverage. We ask whether analyst coverage is a useful variable for explaining why 
stocks trade at a discount (i.e., low excess value) relative to the value of their industry peers.8 We argue 
that a possible reason for the discounting of stocks is that they have weak analyst coverage. Stocks with 
weak analyst coverage are likely to be associated with increased future earnings uncertainty, information 
asymmetries, and non-value maximizing managerial behavior.9 Therefore, such stocks are expected to 
trade at low prices as investors would find them less attractive and more difficult to value.  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued that security analysis has a positive effect on firm value 
because security analysts act as external monitors of managerial misconduct. That is, security analysis is 
likely to have a positive influence on firm value by restricting managers’ non-value maximizing activities.10 
This view also implies that the monitoring activities of analysts tend to reduce informational asymmetries 
between managers and outside investors. Security analysis is also believed to improve informational 
efficiency and increase market’s cognizance.11 All these arguments suggest that in the absence of private 
information acquisition and processing by analysts, stock prices would less precisely reflect their intrinsic 
values. We test the hypothesis that firms with negative (positive) excess analyst coverage ( i.e., firms 
whose analyst coverage is lower (higher) than that of their imputed analyst coverage) will trade at a 
discount (premium). 
While security analysis acts as an external monitoring mechanism that reduces agency costs, 
corporate governance, an internal monitoring mechanism, also deals with the agency problems arising 
                                                                 
7 For multi-segment firms, the imputed analyst coverage is measured as the sum of the average number of analysts 
covering single-segment firms in the industries corresponding to the firm’s business segments, adjusting for size.
         
8 The terms discount (relative to the value of industry peers),  negative excess value, undervaluation, and mispricing 
are used interchangeably throughout the paper.  
9 The inverse relation between non-value maximizing managerial behavior and security analysis draws on Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) study of agency problems. 
10 Doukas et al (2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that 
security analysis has an adverse effect on agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and  management 
of the firm.  
11 A stock’s price tracks its fundamental value more closely when it has substantial analyst coverage. Moyer et al. 
(1989) argue that analysts provide useful inputs to the financial markets. These inputs are an important element of 
the marketplace’s informational efficiency characteristics. Hence, the positive relationship between analyst coverage 
and firm value (see Chung and Jo (1997)) can also be attributed to the information intermediation activities of 
analysts. Merton (1987) argues that a firm benefits when additional investors are made aware of its existence 
because this increases the liquidity of the firm’s equity. That is, security analysis may have a positive effect on firm 
 from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Thus the potential discounting of 
stocks may also be related to the degree of expropriation of outside investors by insiders (weak 
shareholder rights) as reflected in firms’ governance characteristics.  Therefore, in our empirical 
investigation of the deviation of stock prices from their imputed values, we also control for the influence of 
corporate governance. The valuation effects of corporate governance are investigated using the 
corporate governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001). Stocks of firms with weak 
governance attributes are expected to trade at a discount because they have high potential for wealth 
expropriation.12 
 This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our analysis explores the possible 
link between excess analyst coverage and asset prices. We provide evidence in support of the view that 
excess analyst coverage explains a significant portion of the stock’s undervaluation. This suggests that 
analysts produce pertinent information about the future prospects of the firm, not covered in conventional 
financial accounting reports. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that excess analyst coverage leads to 
more informative stock prices and offers an information-based explanation on why stocks trade at a 
discount and why the discount varies across firms. Second, the paper documents that the information 
inherent in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, a surrogate for investor uncertainty, plays an important role 
in the determination of asset prices. Third, our analysis contributes to the law and finance literature that 
examines the effect of national and state law on firm value by providing evidence that corporate-
governance provisions impact on firm value.13 Our empirical tests produce results consistent with the view 
that stocks of firms with high managerial power (i.e., low investor rights/weak corporate governance 
“constitution”) trade at a discount.  Finally, consistent with Doukas et al. (2000), who show that security 
analysis exerts greater monitoring on restricting managers’ non-value maximizing activities in focused 
than diversified firms, our findings show an inverse relation between excess analyst coverage and 
diversification.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
value by reducing its cost of capital through an expansion of its ownership base. Brennan and Hughes (1991) and 
Chung and Jo (1996) also argue that investors tend to trade only securities that they are cognizant.  
12 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) find that weaker shareholder rights are associated with lower profits, lower sales 
growth, higher capital expenditures, and a number of corporate acquisitions.   
13 See La Porta et al. (2001) for an analysis of the relation between international shareholder protection and firm 
value. 
  This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the link between excess value 
and excess analyst coverage and develop the hypotheses. Section III contains a description of the data 
sources and sample selection process. It also specifies the estimation of the excess market value and 
analyst coverage measures used in the analysis. Section IV presents and describes the empirical results. 
Section V provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
 
II. Excess firm value and excess analyst coverage 
 Several studies using the excess market value metric (see, for example, Berger and Ofek (1995), 
among others) have documented that the average diversified firm trades at a discount relative to non-
diversified comparable single-segment firms.14   An underlying theme of this literature is that diversified 
firms tend to misallocate funds by cross-subsidizing poorly performing (low growth opportunities) divisions 
(Berger and Ofek (1995)). Consistent with this result, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) model the 
power struggles among firm’s divisions and show that managers of diversified firmsdirect resources 
inefficiently. Moreover, they show that the diversification discount increases with the diversity of 
investment opportunities of the firm. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) show that the rent-seeking behavior of 
divisional managers tends to undermine the allocational efficiency of internal capital markets.15 Several 
studies, however, have raised substantial doubt about the diversification discount (Hyland (1999) and 
Campa and Kedia (2000), Chevalier (2000), and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002),Whited (2001),and 
Villalonga (2000)). More recently, Mansi and Reeb (2002), show that the measure of excess value, as 
developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), creates a downward bias in diversified firms because it captures 
only the shareholder value of the firm.  Using an excess "firm value" measure instead, they document that 
diversification does not destroy firm value. Notably, this stream of research does not attribute the discount 
(negative excess value), found in firms with diverse industrial activity, to the diversity of the firm itself. 
                                                                 
14 Berger and Ofek (1995) report that diversified firms are priced, on average, at approximately a 12% discount 
relative to comparable stand-alone firms. Lins and Servaes  (1999) find supporting out-of-sample evidence by 
reporting similar-sized discounts in Japan and Servaes  (1999) find supporting out-of-sample evidence by reporting 
similar-sized discounts in Japan and the U.K. 
15 Denis et al (1997) provide evidence in support of an agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. Their 
findings suggest that agency problems in diversified firms are liable for the diversification discount. They also attribute 
the recent rise in corporate focus to market’s disciplinary forces.  
  Unlike the emphasis placed on diversified firms by the previous literature, in this paper  we 
address the issue of equity undervaluation (i.e, negative excess market value) across all firms.16 
Specifically, we examine the relation between excess market value and excess analyst coverage. We 
assume that the number of analysts covering the average firm in a particular industry provides a 
benchmark of the analyst coverage that is necessary to provide effective coverage of a firm operating in 
that industry. This benchmark is used to measure the minimum number of analysts required to effectively 
monitor managerial behavior, disseminate information that would enable investors to assign market 
values close to the firm’s intrinsic value, and achieve a satisfactory level of investor cognizance. Our 
excess analyst coverage measure draws on the concept of residual analyst coverage used in Hong, Lim 
and Stein (2000) as a measure of firm -specific information diffusion. The unique feature of the excess 
analyst coverage measure is that it is designed to represent the size-adjustment characteristic of the 
residual analyst coverage measure (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)) and measure coverage relative to the 
typical analyst coverage of the firm’s industry peers. Furthermore, it captures all three main functions of 
security analysis as explained below.  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued that security analysis can address the agency 
problems that are induced by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation and 
reduce informational asymmetries between managers and outside investors (Doukas et al. (2000)). 
These effects of security analysis are likely to be reflected in higher firm value. In this respect, our 
analysis investigates whether excess analyst coverage can explain the cross-sectional variation in excess 
market value of firms. Hence, excess analyst coverage helps to determine the transparency of the firm to 
outside investors and how intensely a firm is monitored by information intermediaries.  Stocks of firms 
with weaker (stronger) analyst coverage are expected to have a lower (greater) valuations than their 
average industry peers as these firms are more (less) likely to engage in non-value maximizing corporate 
activities.  
 If the number of analysts covering a firm proxies for the total resources spent on private 
information acquisition (Bhushan (1989)), then firms with large analyst following should have a greater 
                                                                 
16 Security analysts issue forecast of earnings per equity share and stock recommendations. Therefore we expect a 
link between excess analyst following and equity mispricing. 
 amount of private information filtered to investors. Trading of such securities should be more 
informationally efficient (Moyer et al. (1989). Thus, investors would  regard a firm as more transparent 
(opaque) if the firm is covered by a relatively large (small) number of analysts generating more (less) 
private information. High (low) analyst coverage would also entail lower (higher) uncertainty about the 
future prospects of the firm.  As a result, demand for the firm’s shares are expected to rise (decline), and  
so will the level of the stock’s valuation relative to the average member in its industry. The distinct feature 
of our research design is that excess analyst coverage, a surrogate of the effort analysts expend (number 
of analysts) to cover a given firm relative to the effort analysts expend to cover the average firm in its 
industry, measures the informational efficiency of investors and markets. Moreover, analyst coverage 
tends to increases investor cognizance of securities they cover. This, in turn,  may increase trading 
volume and market valuation through expansion of the stock’s ownership base.17  Merton’s (1987) model 
demonstrates that firm values are positively associated with the breadth of investor cognizance. 
Consequently, firms with strong analyst coverage are expected to have higher valuations. Chung and Jo 
(1996) and Doukas et al. (2000) provide evidence consistent with this argument. Hence, when a firm’s 
analyst coverage decreases (increases) relative to that of its average industry peers ( i.e.,  its imputed 
analyst coverage),  investor cognizance about the firm is likely to be lower (higher) than that of the 
average firm in the industry. Therefore, the firm’s stock is expected to trade at a discount (premium) 
relative to its imputed market value.  
  
III. Data 
A. Sample Selection 
 Our analysis is based on all firms covered in the Standard & Poor's Compustat Primary, 
Secondary, Tertiary, Full Coverage, Research and Industry Segment  databases over the 1979-1997 
period.  Firms with total sales of less than $20 million are excluded in order to avoid cases of firms with 
distorted valuation multiples due to very low sales figures. Firms are also required to have no segments 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
17 Merton(1987) argues that a firm benefits when additional investors are made aware of its existence because this 
increases the liquidity of the firm’s equity. Brennan and Hughes (1991) and Chung and Jo (1996) also argue that 
 with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 (i.e., no segments in the financial services industries). Firms 
included in the sample must also have information on total capital, measured as market value of common 
equity plus book value of debt, and their sum of segment sales should be within 1% of the total sales 
reported for the firm in the Compustat database (as in Berger and Ofek(1995)). These restrictions, 
required for the computation of the excess market value measure of each firm, resulted in a sample of 
49388 firm-year observations, of which 12491 (36447) are associated with multi-segment (single-
segment) firms.  
 For the construction of the excess analyst coverage measure, we also require that firms have 
analyst coverage data available in the 1998 I/B/E/S database. Following Easterwood and Nutt (1999), we 
selected the number of analyst forecasts issued eight months prior to fiscal year-end for all stocks 
covered by security analysts. This permits us to create a uniform analyst coverage measure in terms of 
forecast horizon across all firms. The eight month horizon is also established to ensure that analysts have 
the previous year's annual report available to them at the time their forecast is made.18 Observations are 
assigned to particular calendar years based on the month the forecast was recorded in I/B/E/S. Our final 
sample includes 32802 firm-year observations for 5983  firms with complete excess market value data 
and analyst coverage data eight months prior to fiscal year end. 
B. Measures of Excess Market Value and Analyst Coverage 
  Since our objective is to study the relation between the excess market value of the firm’s equity 
and  excess analyst coverage, we need to develop measures for these variables. Following Berger and 
Ofek (1995), we define the excess value (exval)of the firm as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s 
actual value to its imputed value.19  Actual value of the firm is measured by its total capital. The imputed 
value is equal to the sum of imputed values for each segment.  Imputed values for each of the firm’s 
segments are calculated by multiplying the median ratio, for single-segment firms in the same industry as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
investors tend to trade only securities that they are familiar with. Gervais et al (2001) suggest that a firm with small 
investor base is likely to be undervalued due to limited risk sharing. 
18  According to Penman (1987) the vast majority of firms (about 92 percent) file their annual reports with the 
SEC within three months after the fiscal year end. 
19 Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we eliminated extreme exval observations, i.e. cases where the absolute value 
of the natural logarithm of actual to total imputed value is greater than 1.386.  
 the segment’s designated industry, of total capital to sales by the segment’s level of sales.20 The sum of 
the segments’ imputed values are an estimate of the firm’s value if its segments were operated as stand-
alone units (i.e., the firm’s total imputed value). Since the excess market value measure captures only the 
shareholder value of the firm (Mansi and Reeb (2002)), a positive excess market value indicates that a 
firm’s equity value is above its stand-alone counterparts (i.e., stock  trades at a premium), while a 
negative excess market value indicates that a firm’s equity value is below that of its stand-alone 
components (i.e., stock trades at a discount).21  
 The excess analyst coverage (excov) measure is constructed using the Berger and Ofek (1995)  
procedure employed for the estimation of the excess market value measure.  Specifically, the excess 
analyst coverage measure is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual number of 
analyst following to its imputed analyst following. A firm’s imputed analyst following is the sum of the 
imputed analyst following of its segments. A segment’s imputed analyst coverage is equal to the 
segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median analyst coverage to sales ratio. Thus, excess analyst 
coverage indicates whether the firm’s analyst coverage is comparable to that of its stand-alone 
counterparts. If excov is positive (negative), that indicates that the firm is followed by more (less) analysts 
than a similar firm in the same industry. For a multi-segment firm, a positive (negative) excov implies that 
it is followed by more (less) analysts than it would if its segments were operated as stand-alone units, 
after adjusting for size. 
                                                                 
20 We also repeated this procedure using assets-multipliers as was done in Berger and Ofek (1995). The results 
using the excess market values based on asset-multipliers - not reported here, but available upon request - are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the ones based on sales-multipliers presented in this study.  
21 To illustrate that our excess market value measure is comparable to the one constructed by Berger and Ofek 
(1995), we examine the mean and median excess market value for the whole sample of the COMPUSTAT universe 
(49388 firm-year observations) as well as for the sub-samples of single- and multi -segment firms. The mean and 
median values for the whole sample are _0.0327 and _0.0149, respectively. The mean excess market value for 
single-segment firms is _0.0080, while the median is zero. The latter is of course not surprising, since we are using 
multipliers for the median single segment firm in each industry to compute the excess market value. In contrast to the 
single_segment firms, diversified (multi_segment) firms display significantly lower mean (_0.1022) and median 
(_0.1192) excess market value, indicating that, on average, diversified firms trade at a discount. The magnitude of the 
discount for diversified firms in our sample is comparable with that reported in prior studies (e.g., Berger and Ofek 
(1995) report mean exval of _0.122 for diversified firms using a sample of 3,884 firm_year observations over the 
1986_1991 period). In addition, consistent with the diversification discount evidence of past studies, the mean and 
median excess market values are significantly lower for diversified firms than focused firms, as evidenced by the 
highly significant t_statistic and Wilcoxon rank_sum z_statistic, respectively. Interestingly, 59 percent of the 
diversified firms trade at a discount, while 49 percent of the single_segment firms have negative excess market value 
values. 
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics  for the measures of excess market value and analyst 
coverage.  Stock of firms with positive (negative) excess analyst coverage, as shown in Panel A, trade at 
the premium (discount).  The mean (median) excess market value for firms with positive excess analyst 
coverage is 0.2379 (0.2030) while the mean (median) value for firms with negative excess analyst 
coverage is -0.1016 (-0.0803). The mean (median) difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Moreover, Panel B reveals that firms whose stocks that trade at a premium (discount) have positive 
(negative) excess analyst coverage as well. The median excess analyst coverage for firms with positive 
excess market value is 0.0133 while the median value for firms with negative excess analyst coverage is -
0.5026. The median difference Wilcoxon rank-sum z-score is 54.47 and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. These results are in agreement with the view that excess analyst coverage is positively 
associated with excess market value, suggesting that stocks of firms with analyst coverage in excess of 
the industry average coverage trade at a premium.22 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
IV. Empirical results 
 In this section we address the relation between excess analyst coverage and the excess market 
value of the firm’s equity using univariate and multivariate tests. Table 2 reports means of excess market 
value and analyst coverage characteristics of quintile portfolios formed annually over the 1979-1997 
period. These quintile portfolios are formed after ranking firms based on exval and excov, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the quintile excess market value portfolios across 
firms. The mean excess analyst coverage for the overall sample is -0.2813, indicating that on average 
firms included in our final sample are followed by less analysts than their stand-alone counterparts 
(imputed analyst coverage). For the firms that trade at a discount (low excess value firms(Q1)), we find 
that they have low excess analyst coverage. Mean excess analyst coverage for low excess value firms 
(Q1) firms is considerably lower than that of high excess value firms (Q5). The mean difference between 
                                                                 
22 We also find, not reported here, that multi-segment firms have considerably lower excess analyst coverage than 
single-segment firms. The mean difference Wilcoxon rank-sum z-score  is -60.37 and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level, suggesting that the diversification discount is partly attributed to weak analyst coverage of diversified 
firms. 
 Q5 and Q1 portfolios, reported in the last column, is 1.0248 and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Low excess value firms are also covered by a smaller raw number of analysts than high excess 
value firms. The mean difference between Q5 and Q1 firms is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
(with t-value of 2.7968).  In addition, low excess value firms have higher analyst dispersion than high 
excess value firms, indicating that firms whose stocks trade at a discount (premium) are associated with 
higher (lower) dispersion of earnings forecasts issued by analysts. Hence, divergence of opinion among 
analysts, a surrogate of investor uncertainty, about the earnings prospects of the firm seems to be a 
determinant of the discount. The results also show that low excess value firms are considerably larger 
than high excess value firms. Consistent with untabulated results, the sales-based Herfindhal index 
indicates that low (Q1 )excess value firms are more diversified than high (Q5) excess value firms. The 
mean difference test between low and high excess value firms shows that firms whose stocks trade at a 
discount are significantly more diversified than firms whose stocks trade at a premium, as evidenced by 
the highly significant t- and Wilcoxon rank sum z-statistics.23 On the average, then, focused firms are 
subject to greater analyst coverage and lower dispersion of earnings forecasts than diversified firms. 
 Examining the excess analyst quintile portfolios, reported in Panel B, we observe a monotonic 
and positive relationship between excess analyst coverage and excess market value. These results 
confirm that stocks with low (high) excess analyst coverage trade at a discount (premium). High analyst 
coverage firms are considerably smaller and less diversified firms than low analyst coverage firms. 
Furthermore, high analyst coverage firms are associated with lower analyst dispersion than firms with low 
analyst coverage. The mean difference test between high and low analyst coverage firms is -0.0020 and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that divergence of opinion among 
security analysts about future earnings is much higher in firms characterized by low information 
transparency and sub-par external monitoring. Interestingly, the mean difference  t-statistics for the naf, 
size and herfs variables suggest that high excess analyst coverage firms are smaller, less diversified and 
tracked by fewer analysts than low excess analyst coverage firms. Overall, the evidence appears 
                                                                 
23 The mean difference results for the  exval, naf and size variables are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies. Berger and Ofek (1995), among others, show that diversified firms have significantly lower excess market 
valuation than focused firms. Doukas et al (2000) report that diversified firms are followed by a significantly larger 
number of analysts and are significantly larger than focused firms.  
 consistent with the view advanced in this paper that firm’s excess value is positively linked to the excess 
analyst coverage.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
A. Excess Market Value and Analyst Coverage 
 If excess analyst coverage measures analysts’ monitoring role and the effort to reduce 
information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors by dissemination of firm-specific 
information, it should exert a significant impact on firm’s excess market value. As hypothesized in the 
previous section, the relation between excess analyst coverage and excess market value should be 
positive. To test whether the potential for misvaluation is related to the degree of analyst coverage, we 
estimate the following equation using fixed effects regressions over the 1979-1997 period. 
exval = f(excov, naf, size, ebits, capxs, disp, control variables) 
 Following Berger and Ofek (1995), the above equation controls for firm size (size), profitability , 
(ebits), and growth opportunities, (capxs). The size, ebits and capxs variables are measured by the 
natural logarithm of sales, EBIT-to-sales ratio, and capital expenditures-to-sales ratio, respectively. In line 
with  prior research (Doukas et al. (2000), and Chung and Jo (1996)), we also include controls in these 
equations for the raw number of analysts (naf), and the dispersion among analysts’ forecasts (disp).24 The 
naf variable represents the number of analysts reporting earnings forecasts for the firm’s fiscal year-end 
earnings as of eight months prior to fiscal year-end. The dispersion variable, disp, captures the 
divergence of opinion among analysts’ forecasts and is measured by the standard deviation of the 
forecasts issued eight months prior to the fiscal year-end standardized by the stock price at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. Finally, we control for the firm’s degree of industrial diversification using several 
alternative measures. The diversification measures include, the number of business segments reported 
by the firm (nseg), a sales-based Herfindahl index (herfs), and a sales-based entropy measure, (entro).25  
                                                                 
24 Note that the dispersion measure, disp, requires that at least two forecasts are available for a particular firm. 
Therefore, the regression models including disp rely on a smaller number of observations. 
25 The entropy measure is constructed using the methodology of Palepu (1985) and incorporates three  elements of a 
company’s diversity of operations: (1) the number of a firm’s reported business segments, (2) the distribution of the 
firm’s sales across business segments, and  (3) the degree of relatedness across the different business segments. 
The entropy measure is defined as entro = Gj Pj ln(1/Pj), where Pj is the share of the j th segment in the total sales of 
the firm. 
 Since, our analysis relies on the combination of cross-sectional and times series data for 5983 firms, we 
use fixed-effects regression procedures to capture the heterogeneity among individual firms.26  
 Table 3 reports panel data regression results for ten different specifications of the above model. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the evidence shows that there is a positive relationship between excess 
market value and excess analyst coverage. The coefficient of the excess analyst coverage, excov, 
variable is positive and significant at the1percent level in all regressions, indicating that firms with positive 
excess analyst coverage are associated with higher (lower) excess values. That is, stocks of firms with 
analyst coverage above that of their industry peers trade at higher values than stocks of comparable firms 
with analyst coverage below that of their industry peers. 
 The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with the findings of previous studies (i.e., 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Chung and Jo (1996), among others).The coefficients of naf, ebits and capxs 
variables are invariably positive and significant, while the size variable has negative and significant 
coefficients in all regressions. These results indicate that excess market value increases with the number 
of analysts that follow the firm, profitability and growth opportunities, while it decreases with size. 
Interestingly, the evidence also shows that dispersion in earnings’ forecasts among analysts, disp,  is 
negatively related to excess market value, consistent with the notion that investor uncertainty reduces 
shareholder value. The coefficients of the diversification variable, nseg,  are not significant. The 
coefficients of the other two diversification variables, however, have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that corporate diversification reduces shareholder value.  
 Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that security analysis has a positive valuation 
impact of firm value by reducing managerial misconduct and information asymmetries between insider 
                                                                 
26 The fixed-effects estimator technique (also known as the within-groups estimator or the least squares dummy 
variable model) transforms the data into deviations from individual means. It is appropriate when the focus is on the 
particular cross-sectional units used to estimate the model -as is the case here. The drawback of the fixed-effects 
estimator model is that it cannot estimate time-invariant effects. On the other hand, the random effects (or error 
components) model treats the individual (firm) effect as a random component of the error term and the parameters 
are estimated by generalized least squares (GLS). The random effects model’s drawback is that it requires the 
assumption that the unobservable firm effect is uncorrelated with the observable parameters, which in this case 
would be a questionable assumption. For the purpose of choosing among the fixed-effects and the random-effects 
models we compute the Hausman test P2-statistic that indicates whether the random-effects and the fixed-effects 
models coefficients are significantly different from each other. A high P2-statistic rules in favor of the fixed-effects 
model.  It should be noted that the results using the random effects model are qualitatively similar to the ones from 
the fixed-effects model presented here.   
 and outside investors.27 The evidence suggests that stocks are likely to trade at a discount when they 
have inferior analyst coverage relative to the analyst coverage that similar firms have in the same 
industry. Moreover, the evidence points out that firms with high excess analyst coverage are subject to 
lower earnings forecast dispersion than firms with low excess analyst coverage and, therefore, investors 
are likely to attach higher values to the stocks of  these firms because they perceive them as less risky. In 
general, firms are likely to experience increases (decreases) in shareholder value when excess analyst 
coverage improves (deteriorates). Our results are consistent with managers’ desire to decrease 
asymmetric information by issuing tracking stock and activities of increasing industrial focus through asset 
sales. These actions invariably result in improved security analyst coverage. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
B. Excess Market Value and Corporate Governance: A Robustness Test 
B1. Univariate Results 
 So far we have addressed the potential for mispricing from an external perspective. We asked the 
question of whether analyst coverage is a relevant variable in explaining the stock’s excess market 
valuation. We now examine the excess market value of the firm’s equity from an internal perspective. In 
other words, we investigate whether the stock’s excess market valuation is associated with weak 
corporate governance characteristics. To test the valuation effects of corporate governance, we introduce 
in our analysis a corporate governance index (gi), in our analysis originally developed by Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2001). This index uses 24 different provisions that define the power sharing relationship 
between managers and investors. The index is constructed by adding one point for every provision that 
restricts shareholder rights, or increases managerial power. Thus gi  has a range from 0 to 24, where 
higher values indicate lower investor rights (higher managerial power)  The gi is available for the years 
1990, 1993 and 1995, and not for every firm included in the dataset used in the previous tables. The total 
number of firm-year observations for gi  is 2316. 
 Panels A and B of Table 4 report quintile portfolios formed each year based on the excess value 
(exval) and coverage (excov) measures, respectively. The Table also reports the mean difference tests 
between the Q5 and Q1 portfolios. Consistent with the view that strong corporate governance protects 
                                                                 
27  For a sub-sample of all equity firms, we find similar results to those reported here. 
 shareholder rights (reduces managerial power), the evidence shows that portfolios with high (low) excess 
value have low (high) gi values. Firms with increased managerial power (weak corporate governance 
characteristics) exhibit low excess values.  The mean difference test statistic between the top (Q5) and 
bottom (Q1) quintiles indicates that firms whose stocks trade at a discount have significantly weaker 
corporate governance characteristics (managerial power firms) than firms whose stocks trade at a 
premium, as evidenced by the highly significant t-statistic. The evidence, as shown in Panel B,  also 
reveals that firms with high coverage (Q5), are associated with low gi  values while firms with low analyst 
coverage (Q1) have high gi  values. The  t-statistic of the mean difference test is 0.5582 and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
B2. Cross-section Regression Results 
 To test whether the cross-section of excess market value is related to the firm’s governance 
characteristics, we introduce the governance index, gi,  in the regression analysis and estimate the 
following equation using OLS regressions with year dummy variables to control for individual year effects. 
exval = f(excov, gi, naf, size, ebits, capxs, disp, control variables) 
Table 5 presents the regression results. Consistent with the evidence reported in Table 3, these findings 
invariably show that there is a strong positive relationship between excess market value and excess 
analyst coverage. As before, controlling for the firm’s governance characteristics, the coefficient of the 
excess analyst coverage variable is positive and significant at the1percent level in all regressions, 
indicating that stocks with analyst coverage above that of their industry peers trade at higher values than 
comparable stocks with analyst coverage below that of their industry peers. As expected, the regression 
results also reveal that there is a negative and significant relation between excess market value and the 
corporate governance index. Consistent with the evidence of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001), who find 
that firms with weaker shareholder rights have lower profits, our evidence indicates that firms with weak 
governance (higher managerial power) trade at a discount. The coefficients of the naf, size, ebits and disp 
variables remain significant and with the expected sign, while the coefficients of all three diversification 
measures become insignificant at any conventional level, suggesting that corporate diversification does 
not necessarily result in value loss. This result appears to be consistent with several recent studies that 
 have raised considerable doubts about the diversification discount.28  Overall, these results provide 
support for the conjecture that stocks of firms with low excess analyst coverage and weak corporate 
governance are more prone to trade at a discount (negative excess market valuation). 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
V. Conclusions   
 In this paper we assess the excess shareholder value from the analyst coverage perspective for a 
panel of firms over the 1979-1997 period. Specifically, we analyze whether the negative excess valuation 
of stocks is associated with low excess analyst coverage by examining whether analyst coverage is an 
important variable for explaining why stocks trade at a discount (i.e., negative excess value) relative to 
the value of their industry peers. We hypothesize that firms with high (low) excess analyst coverage are 
exposed to less (more) information asymmetry between managers and investors, managerial misconduct 
and uncertainty about future earnings than do other firms. Therefore, stocks with low analyst coverage 
are expected to trade at low prices as they would be less attractive and more difficult for investors to 
value. We also hypothesize that stocks of firms with weak corporate governance are expected to trade at 
a discount because it is believed that they have high potential for wealth expropriation. 
 Our findings offer evidence in support of the view that excess analyst coverage explains a 
significant portion of the firm’s equity undervaluation, indicating that weaker (stronger) excess analyst 
coverage results in less (more) informative prices. Our empirical results are also consistent with the 
notion that stocks of firms with high managerial power (i.e., low investor rights/weak corporate 
governance) trade at a discount. Finally, our analysis indicates that the information inherent in the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts, a surrogate for investor uncertainty, plays an important role in the 
determination of asset prices. We find an inverse relation between analyst dispersion and excess firm 
value, suggesting that divergence of opinion among analysts about the future prospects of earnings 
contributes to the discounting of stocks. 
                                                                 
28 See, Hyland (1999), Campa and Kedia (2000), Chevalier (2000), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) Villalonga 
(2000b) and Mansi and Reeb (2002). 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Excess Value and Excess Analyst Coverage Measures Based on the 
Intersection of the Compustat and I/B/E/S Samples (N=32802) 
 
Reported are descriptive statistics for the excess value (Panel A) and excess analyst coverage measures using the 
sample of firms that fulfill the following two criteria: (1) be followed by security analysts (i.e., be listed in I/B/E/S), and 
(2) be listed in Compustat with sales more than $20 million and information available from the Compustat Industry 
Segment (CIS) database for the years 1979-1997. Excess value (exval) is computed as in Berger and Ofek (1995) 
using a sales multiplier. Excess analyst coverage (excov) is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual number of analyst following to its imputed analyst following. A firm’s imputed analyst following is the sum of the 
imputed analyst followings  of its segments, where its segment’s imputed analyst following is equal to the segment’s 
sales multiplied by its industry median analyst following to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the 
industry).   
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the excess value (exval). Also reported are the mean and median difference tests  
for exval between the samples of firms with analyst coverage exceeding the imputed analyst coverage (excov$0) and 
with analyst coverage short of the imputed analyst coverage (excov<0). The mean (median) difference test statistic is 
the t- (Wilcoxon rank-sum z-) statistic.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Whole sample 
 
(N=32802) 
Firms with 
excov $ 0 
(N=14014) 
Firms with 
excov < 0 
(N=18788) 
Mean (median) 
difference tests: 
t-value, (z-statistic) 
mean 0.0434 0.2379 -0.1016 60.17 *** 
std. deviation 0.5326 0.5160 0.4974  
minimum  -1.3856 -1.3829 -1.3856  
25th percentile -0.2977 -0.0778 -0.4304  
median 0.0138 0.2030 -0.0803 56.95 *** 
75th percentile 0.3816 0.5949 0.1975  
maximum  1.3859 1.3854 1.3859  
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for excess analyst coverage (excov). Also reported are the mean and median 
difference tests  for excov between the samples of firms valued at an equity premium (exval$0) and at an equity 
discount (exval<0), respectively. The mean (median) difference test statistic is the t- (Wilcoxon rank-sum z-) statistic.   
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Whole sample 
 
(N=32802) 
Firms with 
exval $ 0 
(N=17804) 
Firms with 
exval < 0 
(N=14998) 
Mean (median) 
difference tests: 
t-value, (z-statistic) 
mean -0.2813 -0.0179 -0.5941 53.48 *** 
std. deviation 1.0137 0.9781 0.9651  
minimum  -7.3003 -7.2123 -7.3003  
25th percentile -0.8834 -0.5499 -1.1839  
median -0.1642 0.0133 -0.5026 54.47 *** 
75th percentile 0.3496 0.5949 0.0194  
maximum  5.4267 5.4267 4.0813  
 
 
 
 Table 2 
 
Excess Value and Analyst Coverage Characteristics of Quintile Portfolios Formed by Excess 
Value (exval), and Excess Analyst Coverage (excov)  
 
This table reports means of excess value and analyst coverage characteristics of quintile portfolios formed each year 
based on exval (panel A) and excov (Panel B). exval is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where its 
segment’s imputed value is equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median capital to sales ratio 
(computed for single-segment firms in the industry). analyst coverage characteristics are described by the following 
variables:  excov, the excess analyst following measure, computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual number of analyst following to its imputed analyst following. A firm’s imputed analyst following is the sum of the 
imputed analyst followings  of its segments, where its segment’s imputed analyst following is equal to the segment’s 
sales multiplied by its industry median analyst following to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the 
industry). naf is the number of analysts following the firm (i.e., number of analysts providing one fiscal year ahead 
earnings forecasts, 8 months prior to fiscal year-end). disp is the dispersion of analyst forecasts, measured as the 
standard deviation of forecasts made 8 months prior to fiscal year-end standardized by the beginning of the fiscal 
year stock price. size is the natural logarithm of sales. herfs is the sales-based Herfindahl index.  Q5-Q1 results 
represent differences in means between the top (Q5) and bottom (Q1) quintiles. The sample period is 1979-1997. 
The sample size is 32802 firm-year observations. Note that the sample size for the disp variable is 27038 firm-year 
observations. This is due to the additional requirement that there are at least two forecasts available in order to 
compute disp. 
 
Panel A: Excess value (exval) portfolios 
 
 
Q1 
Low exval  Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
High exval All firms 
Q5 - Q1 
 
exval -0.6999 -0.2200 0.0275 0.2987 0.8090 0.0434 1.5090 *** 
excov -0.7826 -0.4849 -0.2513 -0.1311 0.2422 -0.2813 1.0248 *** 
naf 5.4024 6.8435 7.5819 8.4106 8.1992 7.2883 2.7968 *** 
disp 0.0171 0.0134 0.0102 0.0088 0.0073 0.0111 -0.0098 *** 
size 5.7551 5.8891 5.8202 5.7895 5.3379 5.7184 -0.4172 *** 
herfs 0.8321 0.8414 0.8959 0.8802 0.9186 0.8737 0.0866 *** 
 
Panel B: Excess analyst coverage (excov) portfolios 
 
 
Q1 
Low excov Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
High excov All firms 
Q5 - Q1 
 
exval -0.2095 -0.0867 0.0144 0.1439 0.3487 0.0434 0.5582 *** 
excov -1.7623 -0.7253 -0.1889 0.2152 1.0338 -0.2813 2.7966 *** 
naf 8.8677 7.6441 6.7761 6.7136 6.4457 7.2883 -2.4219 *** 
disp 0.0124 0.0114 0.0111 0.0106 0.0104 0.0111 -0.0020 *** 
size 7.1144 6.1376 5.5937 5.1612 4.6078 5.7184 -2.5067 *** 
herfs 0.7359 0.8428 0.9080 0.9371 0.9429 0.8737 0.2070 *** 
 
***, **, * signify that the observed difference in means is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Table 3 
Panel Data Regressions of Excess Value on Excess Analyst Coverage 
 
This table reports fixed effects regression results for different models.  The dependent variable is excess value, exval, 
measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is 
the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where its segment’s imputed value is equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median capital to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the industry). The 
independent variables are: excov, the excess analyst coverage measure, computed as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of a firm’s actual number of analyst coverage to its imputed analyst coverage. A firm’s imputed analyst coverage 
is the sum of the imputed analyst followings  of its segments, where its segment’s imputed analyst following is equal 
to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median analyst following to sales ratio (computed for single-segment 
firms in the industry). naf is the number of analysts following the firm, i.e. number of analysts providing one fiscal year 
ahead earnings forecasts, 8 months prior to fiscal year-end. size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s annual sales. 
ebits is the ratio of EBIT to sales. capx is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. nseg is the number of business 
segments. herfs is a sales-based Herfindahl index. entro is the entropy measure of diversification. disp is the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of forecasts made 8 months prior to fiscal year 
end standardized by the beginning of the fiscal year stock price.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 
1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
intercept  
0.1006 
*** 
(48.05) 
0.0863 
*** 
(15.82) 
0.3267 
*** 
(11.69) 
0.2499 
*** 
(7.35) 
0.3323 
*** 
(12.13) 
0.1334 
*** 
(57.31) 
0.1101 
*** 
(17.20) 
0.2490 
*** 
(7.64) 
0.1647 
*** 
(4.28) 
0.2558 
*** 
(7.98) 
excov  
0.2032 
*** 
(56.54) 
0.2005 
*** 
(53.88) 
0.1576 
*** 
(35.75) 
0.1566 
*** 
(35.49) 
0.1567 
*** 
(35.51) 
0.2154 
*** 
(50.29) 
0.2123 
*** 
(48.74) 
0.1756 
*** 
(32.46) 
0.1742 
*** 
(32.15) 
0.1742 
*** 
(32.17) 
naf 
 0.0019 *** 
(2.84) 
0.0064 
*** 
(8.12) 
0.0065 
*** 
(8.19) 
0.0065 
*** 
(8.18) 
 0.0026 *** 
(3.91) 
0.0053 
*** 
(6.57) 
0.0054 
*** 
(6.66) 
0.0054 
*** 
(6.65) 
size 
  -0.0621 
*** 
(-11.70) 
-0.0619 
*** 
(-11.65) 
-0.0619 
*** 
(-11.66) 
  -0.0423 
*** 
(-7.10) 
-0.0423 
*** 
(-7.11) 
-0.0424 
*** 
(-7.11) 
ebits 
  0.4005 
*** 
(24.12) 
0.3995 
*** 
(24.06) 
0.3999 
*** 
(24.08) 
  0.4642 
*** 
(22.80) 
0.4624 
*** 
(22.71) 
0.4630 
*** 
(22.74) 
capxs 
  0.2747 *** 
(17.98) 
0.2738 
*** 
(17.92) 
0.2739 
*** 
(17.93) 
  0.2535 *** 
(15.39) 
0.2526 
*** 
(15.34) 
0.2526 
*** 
(15.34) 
nseg   
-0.0015 
(-0.38)     
-0.0027 
(-0.63)   
herfs 
 
   0.0832 *** 
[3.68]  
    0.0919 *** 
(3.72) 
 
entro 
 
    -0.0430 
*** 
[-3.40]  
    -0.0487 
*** 
(-3.55) 
disp 
 
     -0.8623 *** 
(-10.91) 
-0.8392 
*** 
(-10.59) 
-0.3573 
*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.3598 
*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.3597 
*** 
(-4.57) 
Firm effects 
 F-value 
 
7.89 *** 
 
7.40 *** 7.44 *** 7.44 *** 7.45 *** 7.68 *** 
 
7.26 *** 7.36 *** 7.36 *** 7.37 *** 
R2 (within) 0.1065 0.1068 0.1437 0.1441 0.1440 0.1094 0.1100 0.1447 0.1453 0.1452 
Model F-stat  
[Prob > F] 
3196.41 
[0.0000]  
1602.65 
[0.0000]  
719.67 
[0.0000]  
722.28 
[0.0000]  
721.90 
[0.0000]  
1344.47 
[0.0000]  
902.00 
[0.0000]  
507.11 
[0.0000]  
509.35 
[0.0000]  
509.16 
[0.0000]  
Hausman P2 
[Prob > P2] 
2.53 
[0.1116]  
174.70 
[0.0000]  
289.75 
[0.0000]  
292.75 
[0.0000]  
292.47 
[0.0000]  
55.10 
[0.0000]  
165.89 
[0.0000]  
213.86 
[0.0000]  
214.02 
[0.0000]  
214.05 
[0.0000]  
Total N 32802 32802 31559 31559 31559 27038 27038 25966 25966 25966 
# of firms 5983 5983 5814 5814 5814 5146 5146 4981 4981 4981 
 
  
 
 
Table 4 
 
Corporate Governance Characteristics (gi) of Quintile Portfolios Formed by Excess Value (exval), 
and Excess Analyst Coverage (excov)  
 
This table reports means of the corporate governance index (gi) for firms that fall within the quintile portfolios formed 
each year based on exval (panel A) and excov (Panel B). Number of observations are reported in brackets. exval is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is 
the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where its segment’s imputed value is equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median capital to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the industry). analyst 
coverage characteristics are described by the following variables:  excov, the excess analyst coverage measure, 
computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual number of analyst following to its imputed analyst 
following. A firm’s imputed analyst following is the sum of the imputed analyst followings of its segments, where its 
segment’s imputed analyst following is equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median analyst 
following to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the industry). gi is the corporate governance index 
developed in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001). This index uses 24 different provisions that define the power sharing 
relationship between managers and investors. The index is constructed by adding one point for every provision that 
restricts shareholder rights, or increases managerial power. Thus gi has a range from 0 to 24, where higher values 
indicate lower investor rights (higher managerial power). The gi is available for the years 1990, 1993 and 1995, and 
not for every firm included in the data set used in the previous tables. The total number of firm-year observations for 
gi is 2316. Q5-Q1 results represent differences in means between the top (Q5) and bottom (Q1) quintiles. 
 
Panel A: Excess value (exval) portfolios 
 
 
Q1 
Low exval  Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
High exval All firms 
Q5 - Q1 
 
gi 
9.5671 
[395] 
9.2854 
[515] 
9.2951 
[498] 
8.9806 
[515] 
8.4606 
[393] 
9.1278 
[2316] 
-1.1065 *** 
 
Panel B: Excess analyst coverage (excov) portfolios 
 
 
Q1 
Low excov Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
High excov All firms 
Q5 - Q1 
 
gi 
9.5477 
[743] 
9.1150 
[626] 
8.9347 
[414] 
8.7373 
[354] 
8.6480 
[179] 
9.1278 
[2316] 
-0.5582 *** 
 
***, **, * signify that the observed difference in means is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
 Table 5 
Robustness Tests: Regressions of Excess Value on Excess Analyst Coverage Measure and Corporate Governance Index 
This table reports heteroscedasticity-adjusted  regression results for models including the corporate governance index (gi) as an independent variable. The dependent variable is excess value, exval, measured 
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where its segment’s imputed value is equal to the 
segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median capital to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the industry). The independent variables are: excov , the excess analyst coverage measure, 
computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual number of analyst following to its imputed analyst following. A firm’s imputed analyst following is the sum of the imputed analyst followings  of its 
segments, where its segment’s imputed analyst following is equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median analyst following to sales ratio (computed for single-segment firms in the industry). gi is 
the corporate governance index developed in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001). This index uses 24 different provisions that define the power sharing relationship between managers and investors. The index is 
constructed by adding one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights, or increases managerial power. Thus gi has a range from 0 to 24, where higher values indicate lower investor rights (higher 
managerial power)  gi is available for the years 1990, 1993 and 1995, and not for every firm included in the dataset used in the previous tables. naf  is the number of analysts following the firm, i.e. number of 
analysts providing one fiscal year ahead earnings forecasts, 8 months prior to fiscal year end. size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s annual sales. ebits is the ratio of EBIT to sales. capx  is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales. nseg is the number of business segments. rnseg is the munber of related 2-digit SIC code segments. unseg is the number of unrelated 2-digit SIC code segments. rentro and uentro are 
entropy measures of related and unrelated diversification, respectively. disp is the dispersion of analyst forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of forecasts made 8 months prior to fiscal year end 
standardized by the beginning of the fiscal year stock price. Coefficients are heteroscedasticity -adjusted (White (1980)).  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
intercept  
0.2996 *** 
[8.29]  
0.1594 *** 
[4.31]  
0.2592 *** 
(3.13) 
0.2075 ** 
(2.23) 
0.2537 *** 
(3.06) 
0.3466 *** 
[9.30]  
0.1932 *** 
[5.03]  
0.3101 *** 
(3.44) 
0.2432 ** 
(2.49) 
0.3032 *** 
(3.38) 
excov  
0.1619 *** 
[14.24]  
0.1638 *** 
[15.57]  
0.1363 *** 
(9.97) 
0.1321 *** 
(9.64) 
0.1333 *** 
(9.71) 
0.1556 *** 
[13.29]  
0.1701 *** 
[15.48]  
0.1394 *** 
(9.38) 
0.1349 *** 
(9.01) 
0.1361 *** 
(9.09) 
gi 
-0.0142 *** 
[-4.15]  
-0.0174 *** 
[-5.36]  
-0.0154 *** 
(-4.65) 
-0.0147 *** 
(-4.44) 
-0.0149 *** 
(-4.51) 
-0.0148 *** 
[-4.28]  
-0.0169 *** 
[-5.11]  
-0.0151 *** 
(-4.47) 
-0.0145 *** 
(-4.27) 
-0.0147 *** 
(-4.34) 
naf  
0.0147 *** 
[12.98]  
0.0162 *** 
(8.94) 
0.0161 *** 
(8.91) 
0.0161 *** 
(8.93)  
0.0142 *** 
[11.90]  
0.0160 *** 
(8.95) 
0.0159 *** 
(8.92) 
0.0160 *** 
(8.94) 
size   
-0.0298 ** 
(-2.33) 
-0.0285 ** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0289 ** 
(-2.25)   
-0.0309 ** 
(-2.31) 
-0.0300 ** 
(-2.24) 
-0.0302 ** 
(-2.26) 
ebits   
0.4707 *** 
(3.06) 
0.4715 *** 
(3.07) 
0.4714 *** 
(3.07)   
0.3788 ** 
(2.28) 
0.3788 ** 
(2.29) 
0.3788 ** 
(2.29) 
capxs   
0.0086 
(0.12) 
0.0105 
(0.15) 
0.0099 
(0.14)   
-0.0006 
(-0.02) 
0.0009 
(0.01) 
0.0004 
(0.01) 
nseg   
0.0015 
(0.18)     
-0.0021 
(-0.24)   
herfs    
0.0438  
(1.15)     
0.0586   
(1.51)  
entro     
-0.0164 
(-0.75)     
-0.0252 
(-1.13) 
disp      
-5.9320 *** 
(-6.19) 
-5.1277 *** 
(-5.72) 
-4.4710 *** 
(-5.14) 
-4.5018 *** 
(-5.18) 
-4.4952 *** 
(-5.17) 
Year dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Total N 2316 2316 2249 2249 2249 2178 2178 2114 2114 2114 
R2  0.1038 0.1699 0.1937 0.1941 0.1939 0.1376 0.1958 0.2114 0.2122 0.2118 
Model F-stat  
[Prob > F] 
62.77 
[0.0000]  
94.81 
[0.0000]  
60.93 
[0.0000]  
60.76 
[0.0000]  
60.79 
[0.0000]  
52.88 
[0.0000]  
75.30 
[0.0000]  
50.43 
[0.0000]  
50.56 
[0.0000]  
50.47 
[0.0000]  
  
